Should Science Speak to
Faith? A dialog between Lawrence Krauss and Richard Dawkins
by
Scientific American
This article appears in
the July issue of Scientific American Magazine
Two prominent
defenders of science exchange their views on how scientists ought to approach
religion and its followers
EDITORS'
INTRODUCTION
Although the authors are
both on the side of science, they have not always agreed about the best ways to
oppose religiously motivated threats to scientifi c practice or instruction.
Krauss, a leading physicist, frequently steps into the public spotlight to
argue in favor of retaining evolutionary theory in school science curricula and
keeping pseudoscientifi c variants of creationism out of them. An open letter
he sent to Pope Benedict XVI in 2005, urging the pontiff not to build new walls
between science and faith, led the Vatican to reaffi rm the Catholic Church's
acceptance of natural selection as a valid scientific theory.
Dawkins, an evolutionary
biologist, prolifi c author and lecturer, is also an eloquent critic of any
attempt to undermine scientifi c reasoning. He has generally shown less
interest than Krauss, however, in achieving a peaceful coexistence between
science and faith. The title of Dawkins's best-selling book The God Delusion
perhaps best summarizes his opinion of religious belief.
These two allies
compared notes from the front lines during breaks at a conference devoted to
discussing clashes between science and religion held at the Salk Institute for
Biological Studies in San Diego late last year. In a dialogue they re-create
here, the authors explained their respective tactics for engaging the enemy and
tackled some of the questions that face all scientists when deciding whether and
how to talk to the faithful about science: Is the goal to teach science or to
discredit religion? Can the two worldviews ever enrich one another? Is religion
inherently bad? In an extended version of their conversation available at www.SciAm.com/ontheweb,
the authors also delve into whether science can ever test the "God
Hypothesis."
Krauss: Both you and I have devoted a substantial fraction
of our time to trying to get people excited about science, while also
attempting to explain the bases of our current respective scientifi c
understandings of the universe. So it seems appropriate to ask what the primary
goals of a scientist should be when talking or writing about religion. I wonder
which is more important: using the contrast between science and religion to
teach about science or trying to put religion in its place? I suspect that I
want to concentrate more on the fi rst issue, and you want to concentrate more
on the second.
I say this because if
one is looking to teach people, then it seems clear to me that one needs to
reach out to them, to understand where they are coming from, if one is going to
seduce them into thinking about science. I often tell teachers, for example,
that the biggest mistake any of them can make is to assume that their students
are interested in what they are about to say. Teaching is seduction. Telling
people, on the other hand, that their deepest beliefs are simply silly—
even if they are—and that they should therefore listen to us to learn the
truth ultimately defeats subsequent pedagogy. Having said that, if instead the
primary purpose in discussing this subject is to put religion in its proper
context, then perhaps it is useful to shock people into questioning their beliefs.
Dawkins: The fact that I think religion is bad science,
whereas you think it is ancillary to science, is bound to bias us in at least
slightly different directions. I agree with you that teaching is seduction, and
it could well be bad strategy to alienate your audience before you even start.
Maybe I could improve my seduction technique. But nobody admires a dishonest
seducer, and I wonder how far you are prepared to go in "reaching
out." Presumably you wouldn't reach out to a Flat Earther. Nor, perhaps, to
a Young Earth Creationist who thinks the entire universe began after the Middle
Stone Age. But perhaps you would reach out to an Old Earth Creationist who
thinks God started the whole thing off and then intervened from time to time to
help evolution over the difficult jumps. The difference between us is
quantitative, only. You are prepared to reach out a little further than I am,
but I suspect not all that much further.
Krauss: Let me make clearer what I mean by reaching out. I
do not mean capitulating to misconceptions but rather finding a seductive way
to demonstrate to people that these are indeed misconceptions. Let me give you
one example. I have, on occasion, debated both creationists and alien abduction
zealots. Both groups have similar misconceptions about the nature of
explanation: they feel that unless you understand everything, you understand
nothing. In debates, they pick some obscure claim, say, that in 1962 some set
of people in Outer Mongolia all saw a flying saucer hovering above a church.
Then they ask if I am familiar with this particular episode, and if I say no,
they invariably say, "If you have not studied every such episode, then you
cannot argue that alien abduction is unlikely to be happening." I have
found that I can get each group to think about what they are saying by using
the other group as a foil. Namely, of the creationists I ask, "Do you
believe in flying saucers?" They inevitably say "no." Then I
ask, "Why? Have you studied all of the claims?" Similarly, to the
alien abduction people I ask, "Do you believe in Young Earth
Creationism?" and they say "no," wanting to appear scientific.
Then I ask, "Why? Have you studied every single counterclaim?" The
point I try to make for each group is that it is quite sensible to base theoretical
expectations on a huge quantity of existing evidence, without having studied
absolutely every single obscure counterclaim. This "teaching"
technique has worked in most cases, except those rare times when it has turned
out that I was debating an alien abduction believer who was also a creationist!
Dawkins: I like your clarification of what you mean by
reaching out. But let me warn you of how easy it is to be misunderstood. I once
wrote in a New York Times book review, "It is absolutely safe to say that
if you meet somebody who claims not to believe in evolution, that person is
ignorant, stupid or insane (or wicked, but I'd rather not consider that)."
That sentence has been quoted again and again in support of the view that I am
a bigoted, intolerant, closedminded, intemperate ranter. But just look at my
sentence. It may not be crafted to seduce, but you, Lawrence, know in your
heart that it is a simple and sober statement of fact. Ignorance is no crime.
To call somebody ignorant is no insult. All of us are ignorant of most of what
there is to know. I am completely ignorant of baseball, and I dare say that you
are as completely ignorant of cricket. If I tell somebody who believes the
world is 6,000 years old that he is ignorant, I am paying him the compliment of
assuming that he is not stupid, insane or wicked.
Krauss: I have to say that I agree completely with you
about this. To me, ignorance is often the problem, and, happily, ignorance is
most easily addressed. It is not pejorative to suggest that someone is ignorant
if they misunderstand scientific issues.
Dawkins: In exchange, I am happy to agree with you that I
could, and probably should, have put it more tactfully. I should have reached
out more seductively. But there are limits. You would stop short of the
following extreme: "Dear Young Earth Creationist, I deeply respect your
belief that the world is 6,000 years old. Nevertheless, I humbly and gently
suggest that if you were to read a book on geology, or radioisotope dating, or
cosmology, or archaeology, or history, or zoology, you might find it
fascinating (along with the Bible of course), and you might begin to see why
almost all educated people, including theologians, think the world's age is
measured in billions of years, not thousands." Let me propose an
alternative seduction strategy. Instead of pretending to respect dopey
opinions, how about a little tough love? Dramatize to the Young Earth
Creationist the sheer magnitude of the discrepancy between his beliefs and
those of scientists: "6,000 years is not just a little bit different from
4.6 billion years. It is so different that, dear Young Earth Creationist, it is
as though you were to claim that the distance from New York to San Francisco is
not 3,400 miles but 7.8 yards. Of course, I respect your right to disagree with
scientists, but perhaps it wouldn't hurt and offend you too much to be
told—as a matter of deductive and indisputable arithmetic—the
actual magnitude of the disagreement you've taken on."
Krauss: I don't think your suggestion is "tough
love." In fact, it is precisely what I was advocating, namely, a creative
and seductive way of driving home the magnitude and nature of such
misconceptions. Some people will always remain deluded, in spite of facts, but
surely those are not the ones we are trying to reach. Rather it is the vast
bulk of the public who may have open minds about science but simply don't know
much about it or have never been exposed to scientific evidence. In this
regard, let me pose another question, about which you may feel even more
strongly: Can science enrich faith, or must it always destroy it?
The question came to me
because I was recently asked to speak at a Catholic college at a symposium on
science and religion. I guess I was viewed as someone interested in reconciling
the two. After agreeing to lecture, I discovered that I had been assigned the
title Science Enriching Faith. In spite of my initial qualms, the more I
thought about the title, the more rationale I could see for it. The need to
believe in a divine intelligence without direct evidence is, for better or
worse, a fundamental component of many people's psyches. I do not think we will
rid humanity of religious faith any more than we will rid humanity of romantic
love or many of the irrational but fundamental aspects of human cognition.
While orthogonal from the scientific rational components, they are no less real
and perhaps no less worthy of some celebration when we consider our humanity.
Dawkins: As an aside, such pessimism about humanity is
popular among rationalists to the point of outright masochism. It is almost as
though you and others at the conference where this dialogue began positively
relish the idea that humanity is perpetually doomed to unreason. But I think
irrationality has nothing to do with romantic love or poetry or the emotions
that lie so close to what makes life worth living. Those are not orthogonal to
rationality. Perhaps they are tangential to it. In any case, I am all for them,
as are you. Positively irrational beliefs and superstitions are a different
matter entirely. To accept that we can never be rid of them—that they are
an irrevocable part of human nature—is manifestly untrue of you and, I would
guess, most of your colleagues and friends. Isn't it therefore rather
condescending to assume that humans at large are constitutionally incapable of
breaking free of them?
Krauss: I am not so confident that I am rid of irrational
beliefs, at least irrational beliefs about myself. But if religious faith is a
central part of the life experience of many people, the question, it seems to
me, is not how we can rid the world of God but to what extent can science at
least moderate this belief and cut out the most irrational and harmful aspects
of religious fundamentalism. That is certainly one way science might enrich
faith.
In my lecture to the
Catholic group, for instance, I took guidance from your latest book and
described how scientific principles, including the requirement not to be
selective in choosing data, dictate that one cannot pick and choose in one's
fundamentalism. If one believes that homosexuality is an abomination because it
says so in the Bible, one has to accept the other things that are said in the Bible,
including the allowance to kill your children if they are disobedient or
validation of the right to sleep with your father if you need to have a child
and there are no other men around, and so forth.
Moreover, science can
directly debunk many such destructive literal interpretations of scripture,
including, for example, the notion that women are simple chattels, which stands
counter to what biology tells us about the generic biological roles of females
and the intellectual capabilities of women and men in particular. In the same
sense that Galileo argued, when he suggested that God would not have given
humans brains if "he" did not intend people to use them to study
nature, science definitely can thus enrich faith.
Still another benefit
science has to offer was presented most cogently by Carl Sagan, who, like you
and me, was not a person of faith. Nevertheless, in a posthumous compilation of
his 1985 Gifford Lectures in Scotland on science and religion, he makes the
point that standard religious wonder is in fact too myopic, too limited. A
single world is too puny for a real God. The vast scope of our universe,
revealed to us by science, is far grander. Moreover, one might now add, in
light of the current vogue in theoretical physics, that a single universe may
be too puny and that one might want to start thinking in terms of a host of
universes. I hasten to add, however, that enriching faith is far different than
providing supporting evidence for faith, which is something that I believe
science certainly
does not do.
Dawkins: Yes, I love that sentiment of Sagan's, and I'm so
glad you picked it out. I summed it up for the publishers of those lectures on
the book jacket: "Was Carl Sagan a religious man? He was so much more. He
left behind the petty, parochial, medieval world of the conventionally
religious; left the theologians, priests and mullahs wallowing in their
small-minded spiritual poverty. He left them behind, because he had so
much more to be
religious about. They have their Bronze Age myths, medieval superstitions and
childish wishful thinking. He had the universe." I don't think there is
anything I can add in answering your question about whether science can enrich
faith. It can, in the sense you and Sagan mean. But I'd hate to be misunderstood
as endorsing faith.
ÒEnriching
faith is far
different than
providing
supporting
evidence
for faith.Ó
—L.M.K.
Krauss: I want to close with an issue that I think is
central to much of the current debate going on among scientists regarding
religion: Is religion inherently bad? I confess here that my own views have
evolved over the years, although you might argue that I have simply gone soft.
There is certainly ample evidence that religion has been responsible for many
atrocities, and I have often said, as have you, that no one would fly planes
into tall buildings on purpose if it were not for a belief that God was on
their side.
As a scientist, I feel
that my role is to object when religious belief causes people to teach lies
about the world. In this regard, I would argue that one should respect
religious sensibilities no more or less than any other metaphysical
inclinations, but in particular they should not be respected when they are
wrong. By wrong, I mean beliefs that are manifestly in disagreement with
empirical evidence. The earth is not 6,000 years old. The sun did not stand
still in the sky. The Kennewick Man was not a Umatilla Indian. What we need to
try to eradicate is not religious belief, or faith, it is ignorance. Only when
faith is threatened by knowledge does it become the enemy.
Dawkins: I think we pretty much agree here. And although
"lie" is too strong a word because it implies intention to deceive, I
am not one of those who elevate moral arguments above the question of whether
religious beliefs are true. I recently had a televised encounter with the
veteran British politician Tony Benn, a former minister of technology who calls
himself a Christian. It became very clear in the course of our discussion that
he had not the slightest interest in whether Christian beliefs are true or not;
his only concern was whether they are moral. He objected to science on the
grounds that it gave no moral guidance. When I protested that moral guidance is
not what science is about, he came close to asking what, then, was the use of
science. A classic example of a syndrome the philosopher Daniel Dennett has
called "belief in belief."
Other examples include
those people who think that whether religious beliefs are true or false is less
important than the power of religion to comfort and to give a purpose to life.
I imagine you would agree with me that we have no objection to people drawing
comfort from wherever they choose and no objection to strong moral compasses.
But the question of the moral or consolation value of religion—one way or
the other—must be kept separate in our minds from the truth value of
religion. I regularly encounter difficulties in persuading religious people of
this distinction, which suggests to me that we scientific seducers have an
uphill struggle on our hands.
The
conversation between Lawrence M. Krauss and Richard Dawkins continues in an
extended version at www.SciAm.com/ontheweb
SIDEBAR NOTES: BATTLEGROUND OF BELIEFS
In a 2005 survey
of U.S. National Science Teachers Association members:
- 30% said they felt
pressure to omit evolution from their lessons
- 31% said they felt
pressure to include nonscientific alternatives to evolution in their classes
In the 2006
Baylor Religion Survey of 1,721 U.S. adults:
- 69% thought prayer
should be allowed in schools
- 25% thought some UFO
sightings are probably spaceships from other worlds
- 88% rejected the idea
that God favors any particular political party
- 69% rejected the idea
that God favors the U.S. in worldly affairs
In a 2007
Newsweek poll of 1 ,004 U.S. adults:
- 48% thought that God
created humans in their present form in the past 10,000 years
- 30% thought that
humans evolved from simpler life-forms, with God guiding the process
- 48% thought the theory
of evolution is well supported by evidence, but 39% thought the theory is not
well supported.
➥ MORE
TO
EXPLORE
Unweaving the Rainbow. Richard
Dawkins. Houghton Mifflin, 1998.
Questions That Plague Physics.
Lawrence M. Krauss and Claudia
Driefus in Scientific American, Vol. 291,
No. 2, pages 82–85; August 2004.
The God Delusion. Richard
Dawkins. Houghton Mifflin, 2006.
Hiding in the Mirror: The Quest
for Alternate Realities, from
Plato to String Theory. Lawrence
M. Krauss. Penguin, 2006.
Beyond Belief: Science, Religion,
Reason and Survival conference
videos and background:
The official Richard Dawkins Web
site: http://richarddawkins.net/
Lawrence M. KraussÕs home page:
http://www.phys.cwru.edu/~krauss/